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The overall goal of our paper is to better understand water management reform in China’s 
communities, especially focusing on the effect that it will have on the nation’s water resources and the 
welfare of the rural population.  To pursue this goal, the paper has three objectives.  First, we track 
the evolution of water management reform and seek to identify the incentives mechanisms that 
encourage water  managers to more efficiently use water.  Second, we identify the impact of water 
management reform on crop water use, the primary motivation of the policy.  Finally, the paper 
explores how changes in China’s water management reform affect agricultural production, farmer 
income and poverty.  Based on a random sample of 51 villages, 189 farmers and 378 plots in four 
large irrigation districts in Ningxia and Henan provinces, both provinces in China’s Yellow River Basin, 
our results show that two of the main forms of water management reform, Water User Associations 
and contracting, have begun to systematically replace traditional form of collective management.  
The impacts analysis demonstrates that it is not the nominal implementation the reform that matters, 
but rather it is the creation of new management institutions that offer managers incentives to save 
water.  Specifically, when managers in reformed organizations are provided with incentives, they 
save water.  Importantly, given China’s concerns about national food production and poverty 
allevation, the reductions in water do not lead to reductions in either production, income or higher 
incidences of poverty. 
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The Chinese government has identified increasing water scarcity as one of the key problems that 
must be solved if the nation is to meet the objectives of its national development plan in the 
coming years (Zhang, 2001).  Shortages of water are harming efforts to alleviate poverty as well 
as becoming a major source of environmental problems (World Bank, 1998; Zhang, 2000).  In 
many regions of the country, rapidly growing industry and an expanding and increasingly wealthy 
urban population regularly out compete the nation’s farmers for limited  water resources, 
threatening to curtail growth in food production.   
 
In facing the emerging water crisis, leaders typically debate about which of several approaches 
should be used to address  water scarcity problems, although no option has proved very 
successful (Lohmar et al., 2002).  Developing more water resources to increase water supply 
historically has been given the highest priority in resolving water shortages.  Since the 1950s, 
China’s government has invested more than 127 billion US dollars for the construction of 
infrastructure to develop new water resources (Wang, 2000).  Recently, the State Council 
announced plans to allocate more than 50 billion US dollars for the construction of a project to 
move water from the Yangtse River Valley to northern China.  Despite such ambitious goals, the 
high cost of developing new sources of water will make it so that the volume of water that can be 
added to north China’s water equation will only be marginal.  Leaders also have promoted water 
saving technologies and considered whether or not they should use water pricing policy (Chen, 
2002; Rosegrant and Cai, 2002).  Unfortunately, most efforts to encourage the use of 
sophisticated water saving technologies, such as drip and sprinkler irrigation, have failed and in 
the past several years the Ministry of Water Resources has distanced itself from a water policy 
based on water-saving technology (Zai, 2002).  Moreover, political considerations will most likely 
keep leaders from moving too aggressively to raise prices, at least in the agricultural sector 
(Rosegrant and Cai, 2002). 
 
With the failure and infeasibility of traditional methods, leaders in recent years have begun to 
consider water management reform as a key part of their strategy to combat China’s water 
problems since they believe water in agriculture is being used inefficiently.  Despite water 
shortages, users in all sectors of the economy, especially those in agriculture (the nation’s largest 
consumer of water),still do not efficiently use the water that they are allocated. One study, for 
example, estimated that due to the poor management of the nation’s canal network, only 50 
percent of water from the primary canals is actually delivered to the field (Xu, 2001).  Farmers 
also do not efficiently use the water that reaches their fields, wasting between 20 to 30 percent of 
their water.  Hence, only about 40 percent of the surface water allocated to production agriculture 
is actually used by farmers on their crops.  Others have estimated even greater inefficiencies 
(Fang, 2000).  In response, it has been proposed that local leaders reform the institutions that 
manage water in China’s communities (Nian, 2001; Reidinger, 2002). 
 
Despite consensus of the current leadership in China to push water management reform, there is 
considerable debate about its appropriateness.  International evidence shows that water 
management and its institutional arrangements are important measures for dealing with water 
shortage problems (World Bank, 1993; IWMI and FAO, 1995).  Since the 1 980s, many 
developing countries have begun to transfer irrigation management responsibilities from the  
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government to farmer organizations or other private entities in order to mitigate the financial 
burden of water projects and to improve the efficiency of water use and supply (Vermillion, 1997).  
Decentralized water resource management, if structured properly, can provide the incentives 
needed to stabilize and improve the efficiency of irrigation and water supply system.  There are 
some cases internationally where these efforts have failed or even generated negative influences 
(Easter and Hearne, 1993; Vermillion, 1997; Groenfeldt and Svendsen, 2000). 
 
In fact, since the early 1980sand increasingly in the late 1990s, China’s policy makers have 
promoted water management reform, and like similar attempts outside China, the record seems to 
be mixed although most evaluations are based only on anecdotes or case studies (Nian, 2001; 
Huang, 2001; China Irrigation Association, 2002).  Even in those areas in which management 
reform has been well-designed, effective implementation of the reform has been difficult (Ma, 2001; 
Management Authority of Shaoshan Irrigation District, 2002).  Collective action, information 
problems, and getting the incentives right are among t he most important reasons that water 
management reform has failed.  The design of water management reforms themselves also may 
create a number of negative externalities.  Since the reforms provide financial incentives to the 
manager to more efficiently manage water, it is possible that the manager could take a number of 
actions that could negatively affect production, income and the poverty status of certain individuals.  
For example, managers could deliver less water than demanded by farmers or cut off water 
deliveries to slow-paying, poor households.  Surprisingly, despite the high stakes of the reforms 
there is little or no empirically based work that has been conducted to understand and judge the 
effectiveness of water management reform. 
 
The overall goal of this paper is to better understand water management reform in rural 
communities in China’s Yellow River Basins, especially focusing on the effect that it will have on 
the nation’s water resources in farming.  To pursue this goal, the paper has three o bjectives.  
First, we track the evolution of water management reform and seek to identify the incentives 
mechanisms that encourage water managers to more efficiently use water.  Second, we identify 
the impact of water management reform on crop water use, the primary motivation of the policy.  
Finally, the paper explores how changes in China’s water management institutions also affect 
agricultural production, farmer income and poverty.   
 
Study Settings and Data 
 
The data for our study come from a survey conducted in 51 villages in four irrigation districts (IDs) 
in Ningxia and Henan provinces.  To increase the variation among regions, provinces were 
chosen that were located in the upper (Ningxia) and lower reaches (Henan) of the Yellow River 
Basin (YRB).  In selecting the irrigation districts for our study, a number of criteria were 
considered.  From a number of IDs in each province, the two IDs were chosen based primarily on 
water availability, doing so by selecting one that is upstream in the province and one that is 
downstream.  After the IDs were selected, we randomly chose sample villages from the census of 
villages in the upper, middle and lower reaches of the canals within the IDs.
1  Enumerators also 
randomly chose four households within each village.  After getting the basic information about 
each plot, the enumerators chose two plots from each household for more careful investigation.  
In total, we surveyed 51 villages leaders, 56 water managers, 189 farm households and gathered 
information on 378 farm plots. 
 
In order to meet the study’s objectives, we designed three separate survey instruments: one for 
farmers, one for canal managers and one for village leaders.  During our survey, three types of 
management institutions were identified: collective management, Water User Associations (WUAs) 
and contracting.  In our village and canal management questionnaires we recorded the share of 
canals within the village that is controlled by each management type for each of three years (1990, 
1995 and 2001).  In addition, enumerators also asked about how managers were compensated.  
When managers have rights to the earnings of the water management activities (that is, to the 
value of the water saved by water management reform), we say that they face strong incentives  
(or henceforth, refered to as “ with incentives”).  If the incomes from their water management 
                                                                   
1 The two IDs in Ningxia Province are Weining Irrigation District and Qingtongxia Irrigation District. The IDs in Henan 




duties are not connected to water savings, they are said to be “without incentives”. 
 
The survey also collected information that was used to develop several measures of the effects of 
water management reform on water use, production and income.  In order to get relatively 
accurate measures of water use, which in surface water systems is typically difficult to elicit, we 
adopted the strategy to ask all of those that were involved in the irrigation scheme: farmers, water 
managers and village leaders.   We asked about crop water use in a number of different ways: on 
a per irrigation basis, the number of irrigations per crop, the number of hours per irrigation, the 
average depth of the water, etc.  With this information, we were able to combine the various 
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We also systematically collected information on both income and crop production by plot and by 
crop for all cropping seasons during the year 2001.  Income is an estimate of each household’s 
full net income and includes all major sources of income of the household, including that from 
cropping, livestock, off farm wage labor, earnings from the family’s business enterprise, and other 
miscellaneous sources.  With information on income, we were able to construct a measure of 
poverty status by comparing household per capita income (dividing total household income by the 
number of family members, which include the household head, the household head’s spouse and 
all individuals that lived in the household for at least three months per year) with the national 
poverty line (625 yuan per capita per year in 2001).   
 
The rest of the survey instrument asked for information about several other important variables 
believed to affect either water management institutions, outcomes or both.  For example, village 
leaders and water managers were asked if upper-level government officials took steps to 
encourage the extension of reform in their villages.  A number of other questions asked about the 
degree of water scarcity, the level of investment in the village’s irrigation sys tem, as well as a 
number of other village, household and plot characteristics.  Descriptive statistics of the main 
variables are shown in Appendix B. 
 
Evolution of Water Management Reforms 
 
Based on field surveys, after upper-level officials began implementing the reforms, surface water 
is managed in three ways.  If the village leadership through the village committee directly takes 
responsibility for water allocation, canal operation and maintenance (O&M) and fee collection, the 
village’s irrigation system is said to be run by  collective management, the system that essentially 
has allocated water in most of China’s villages during the People’s Republic period.  A  WUA is 
theoretically a farmer-based, participatory organization that is set up to manage the v illage’s 
irrigation water.  In WUAs, a member-elected board is supposed to be assigned the controlling 
rights over the village’s water.  Contracting is a system in which the village leadership establishes 
a contract with an individual to manage the village’s water.   
 
According to our data, since the early 1990s and especially after 1995, reform has successively 
established WUAs and contracting in the place of collective management (Table 1).  The share of 
collective management declined from 91 percent in 1990 to the 64 percent in 2001 (column 5).  
Across our sample, contracting has developed more rapidly than WUAs.  By 2001, 22 percent of 
villages managed their water under contracting and 14 percent through WUAs.  Assuming the 
results from our sample reflect the more general trends across north China, the somewhat more 
rapid emergence of contracting may be due to the ease of setting the system up and the 
similarities of the reforms to the other reforms that have unfolded in rural China (Nyberg and 
Rozelle, 1999).
2   
 
While there has been a shift from collective management to WUAs and contracting during the past 
5 years, water management reform still varies across the four sample IDs.  WUAs and 
contracting have developed more rapidly in Ningxia than in Henan (Table 1).  For example, in 
1995, the collective ran 100 percent of the water management institutions in one of the Ningxia 
IDs (column 1).  By 2001, however, the collective managed water in only 27 percent of the 
sample villages.  WUAs managed water about  23 percent of the villages and contracting 
managed water in approximately 50 percent.  In Ningxia’s other sample ID, the share of villages 
under WUAs and contracting approached 49 percent, almost the same as those under collective 
management (column 2).  I n contrast, significantly less reform occurred in Henan.  Only eight 
percent of the villages in one of the sample IDs and none in the other have moved to either 
contracting or WUAs (columns 3 and 4).   
 
Based on our field survey, although some of the differences in water management among the IDs 
may be due to the characteristics of local villages and local water management initiatives, the 
dramatic differences between Ningxia and Henan Provinces suggest that upper level government 
policy may be playing an important role.  In 2000, in order to promote water management reform, 
Ningxia provincial water officials issued several documents that encouraged localities to proceed 
                                                                   
2 During China’s economic reforms, many government services have been contracted out to private individuals, 
including grain procurement, extension and health services.  
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with water management reform (Wang, 2002).  Regional water officials exerted considerable 
effort to promote water management reform in a number of experimental areas.  The sharp shift 
away from collective management is consistent with an interpretation that these measures were 
effective in pushing (or at least relaxing constraints to) reform.    
 
The differences among the villages in Ningxia and variations in the way that different regions 
implemented the reforms (i.e., some moved to contracting while others shifted to WUAs) show that 
the reforms are far from universal.  In fact, this is what would be expected in China, a nation that 
often allows local governments considerable room in making their own decisions on the exact form 
and timing of institutional changes (Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2000).  In contrast, neither the Henan 
provincial government nor any of the prefectural governments have issued directives mandating 
reforms. 
   
Variation in governance of various water management forms  
 
While the shift in China’s water management institutions demonstrate that the nation’s 
communities are following policy directives that are being developed and issued from upper-level 
governments, when local leaders set up their organizational frameworks in their villages, practice 
often varies from theory.  For example, in practice, at least in the early stages of the development 
of WUAs (the only stage of the organizations that we are observing since this type of management 
is so new), the organization of most WUAs varies sharply from theory.  In most cases (70 percent 
of the WUAs), the governing board of the WUA was the village leadership itself.  In a minority 
share of the cases (30 percent of the WUAs), village leaders appointed a chair or manager to 
carry out the day-to-day duties of the WUAs.  In many of these WUAs that had village-appointed 
leaders, however, the manager actually had close ties to the village leadership, more than half 
being a leader in an earlier time period.  In other words, in terms of the composition of the 
management team, most WUAs differ little from collective management.   
 
An examination of the way the managers are compensated perhaps shows the greatest difference 
between theory and practice.  To show this one needs to understand the way farmers pay fees, 
managers are compensated and how IDs are paid.  In fact, water management reform has 
created a complicated system of fees, payments and charges that embody the primary incentives 
for the managers to save water.  Water fees collected from farmers include two parts: basic water 
fees associated with the fixed quantity of land in the village and volumetric water fees associated 
with the volume of water use.  Set by water bureau officials, the farmer is required to pay the 
basic water fee (which is based on his land holdings) and part of the basic water fee belongs to 
the water manager after it is collected.  This part of the manager’s compensation is paid to him as 
a fixed payment and provides little or no direct incentives to save water.
3     
 
Higher level officials, however, can use the other part of the water fee to provide managers wit h 
more direct incentives.  Prior to the farming year, ID officials determine (on the basis of historic 
use patterns and other criteria) a targeted amount of water that a village should use (called the 
target quantity).  Based on a per cubic meter charge, the total value of the expected water use for 
the village is then divided by the village’s total quantity of land and this volumetric water fee is 
added to the basic water fee to create the farmer’s total water fee.  Therefore, this form of a 
volumetric water fee provides the farmer with no incentives to save water since he pays a fixed fee 
for each hectare of land.  The water manager in some communities, in contrast, does have an 
incentive.  In implementing water management reform ID officials agree that the water manager 
only has to pay the per cubic meter charge for the water that is actually used (actual quantity).  If 
the actual quantity of water delivered to the village (at the request of the water manager) is less 
than the targeted quantity, the difference between the volumetric fee that is collected from the 
farmers and that which he pays for the water is his excess profit .  The excess profit is an amount 
that is earned by the manager beyond the fixed payment.  
 
According to the data, there are sharp differences in the way that villages have implemented the 
incentives part of the reform packages, regardless of whether they are WUAs or contracting (Table 
2).  For example, in 2001, on average, leaders in only 41 percent of villages offered WUA and 
                                                                   
3  Once the manager collects that total fee from the farmer, he turns the basic fee part to the village accountant who in 
turn sends it to the township which is supposed to use the funds to maintain the township’s canal infrastructure.  
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contracting (or  non-collective) managers with incentives that could be expected to induce 
managers to exert effort to save water in order to earn an excess profit (row 1).  In the rest of the 
villages, although there was a nominal shift in the institution type (that is leaders claimed that they 
were implementing WUAs or contracting), in fact, from an incentives point of view, the WUA and 
contracting managers faced no incentives (row 1).  In these villages, water managers are like 
village leaders in a collectively managed system in that they do not have a financial incentive to 
save water.  The incentives offered the managers also differ across IDs (rows 2 to 6).  Hence, to 
the extent that the incentives are the most important part of the reform, the differences across time 
and space mean that it would not be surprising if in some villages WUAs and contracting were 
more effective at saving water than in other villages.   
 
Water Management and Crop Water Use 
 
Although the major objective of water management reform is to save water, descriptive statistics 
using survey data are unclear in that they show that water use in areas with established WUAs 
and contracting compared to those areas still under collective management is lower in some areas, 
but higher in other areas (Table 3).  For example, in the second ID in Ningxia (ID2), the water use 
per hectare in areas that have reformed (WUAs and contracting) is lower than those areas in 
which the collective still manages the water (rows 5 and 6 versus row 4).  However, in Ningxia’s 
other ID (ID1) and in Henan, water use per hectare is higher in those villages that have shifted to 
WUAs or contracting (rows 1 to 3; 7 and 8).   
 
While the effectiveness of changing from collective to non-collective management in terms of 
water saving is not clear, our data show the importance of policy implementation.  In particular, 
the importance of incentives in making the reforms work is shown when comparing water use in 
those villages that provide their water managers with incentives with those that do not (Table 4).  
After reform, when managers face incentives to earn profits by saving water, water use per 
hectare fall by nearly 10 percent when compared to collectively managed systems across our 
Ningxia sample (row 1, columns 1 and 3).  In contrast, when leaders implement water 
management reform without providing incentives, water use rises (column 2).  When examining 
the individual IDs in Ningxia, it was also found that in both cases water use either falls more or 
does not rise as much, as when incentives are provided during reform than when they are not.  In 
ID2, for example, water use falls in both non-collective systems with and without incentives, but it 
falls further for those with incentives (row 3).  In ID1, although water use in the bot h 
non-collective systems rises, it rises by less for those with incentives (row 2).  We also find the 
same patterns occur when examining individual crops (rows 4 to 6).   
 
While our descriptive analysis shows that there is a positive correlation between incentives and 
water savings, in fact, there can be many other factors that are correlated with incentives that are 
creating the tendency of incentives and water savings to move together.  In particular, it can be 
that cropping structure, the nature of the canal system’s investment and the scarcity of water may 
affect the managerial type, the way that reforms are implemented and water use.  As a result, 
multivariate analysis is required to analyze the relationship between water management reform 
and water use and other outcomes.   
 
 
Multivariate Empirical Model and Results: Water Management 
Institution and Incentives Impact on Water Use 
 
Based on the above discussion, the link between water use per hectare and its determinants can 
be represented by the following equation: 
 
jk w  =  jk jk jk k D Z M ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                   (1) 
 
where wjk represents average water use per hectare for household j in village k.  The rest of the 
variables explain water use: Mk, our variable of interest, measures either the type of the water 
management institution or the nature of the incentives faced by the water manager; Zjk, a matrix of 
control variables, represents other village and household factors t hat affect water use.   
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Specifically, we include a number of variables to hold constant the nature of the village’s 
production environment and its cropping structure.  We include variables such as the source of 
water (either surface or ground), the degree of water scarcity and the level of irrigation investment 
per hectare to measure the production environment.  Cropping structure is measured as the 
proportion of the village’s sown area that is in rice.  Household characteristics include age and 
education of the household head and land endowment.  Finally, our model also includes Djk, a 
dummy variable representing the ID that serves the household.  The symbols a, ß, and ? are 
parameters to be estimated and e jk is the error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
other explanatory variables in our initial equations , an assumption that is subsequently relaxed. 
     
Our empirical estimation performs well for our water use model (Table 5).  The goodness of fit 
measure, the adjusted R
2, around 0.45, is sufficiently high for analyses that use cross sectional 
household data.  Many coefficients on our control variables have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant.  For example, we find that after holding constant other factors, households 
that are in villages with more rice area use more water per hectare than other crops.  We also 
find that those villages that face more severe water shortages use less water per hectare.   
 
After holding constant other factors, our results show that the mere fact of shifting management 
from the collective to either a WUA system or contracting by itself does not lead to water savings 
(Table 5, column 1).  In fact, the signs on the coefficients of the WUA and contracting variables 
are negative, suggesting that water use is lower in villages that have moved to noncollective 
management (rows 1 and 2).  However, the standard errors are all large relative to the magnitude 
of the coefficients, which implies that when officials provide water managers with incentives, 
without regard to whether they shifted to WUA or contract management, managers appear to 
reduce water deliveries in the village (Table 5, column 2).  Econometric results show that the 
coefficient on the incentive indicator variable is negative and significant (although only at the 10 
percent level), when compared to the collective management, the omitted institutional type (row 3).  
In other words, without regard to the form of the water management institution, if managers face 
positive incentives, water use per hectare can be reduced by nearly 3000 cubic meters, about 20 
percent of their typical water use.   
 
Although interesting, it is possible that the estimated parameter is biased since water use per 
hectare and water management may be determined simultaneously with water use or that the 
estimated coefficient is affected by unobserved heterogeneity .  For example, it is possible that in 
areas that are facing rising demand for water from cities, farmers naturally reduce water use in 
anticipation of future water restrictions.  At the same time, village leaders in the areas also may 
be trying to forestall the shortages by adopting new institutional arrangements to show that they 
are concerned about the pending water crisis.  In such a situation, the coefficient on the water 
management institution (or incentive) variable could be negative, even if the institution itself has no 
effect.   
 
In order to control for the potential endogeneity of water management types and incentives in the 
water use equation, we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach.  To do so, prior to 
estimating equation (1), a set of variables is regressed against the water management institution 
variable, Mk: 
 
k M = 
k k k Z IV ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                                 (2) 
where the predicted value of M k from equation (2),  k M ˆ , would replace M k in equation (1).  
Equation (2) includes  Zk, which are measures the other village-level control variables (which are 
the same as those in equation 1 (e.g., measures of the village’s production environment and 
cropping structure).     
 
This IV procedure, however, is only valid if the variables in the IV matrix in equation (2) meet the 
definition of instruments.  The key IV in the equation (2) that we use to address the endogeneity 
problem is a variable (Pk) that measures the effect of the decision of regional policymakers to 
promote water management reform in village k.  Such a measure should function well as an 
instrument, especially in our setting, since the officials that were responsible for promoting water 
management reform believed that at least in the short run they were choosing villages on a fairly 
random basis.  An official in one ID told us that initially he went to villages in which he personally  
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knew the local officials.  If the spectrum of the acquaintances of the typical water system officials 
are independent of the amount of water used in the village, our policy variable should meet the 
criteria of an instrumental variable: it is correlated with the decision of a village to participate in 
water management reform but does not have an effect on water use (or income or crop production) 
except through the influence of the reform.  We also include the age and education of the village 
leader as IVs.
4    
 
Examining the results of equation (2) by itself, the model performs well (Appendix C).  The 
adjusted R-squares range from 0.23 to 0.94.  Importantly, the results show that water policy 
intervention variable, P k, is positive and statistically significant; the variable meets the first criteria 
of an IV.  Although the coefficient on the variables measuring village leader characteristics are 
insignificant, the Hausman test of the exclusion restrictions that are designed to test the validity of 
the instruments show that our instruments are statistically valid and meet the second criteria o f 
IVs.
5   
 
When putting the predicted value of the water management variable into the water use model in 
equation (1), our results change little and largely support the findings from the OLS model (Table 5, 
columns 3 and 4).  Compared with OLS estimation, the t-statistic of the estimated coefficient on 
the incentive variable actually rises (row 3).  The magnitude of the coefficient also suggests that 
the savings from providing incentives are large, and in fact even greater.  Other variables held 
constant, where village leaders offer managers positive incentives, water use declines more than 
6000 cubic meter per hectare, or about 40 percent of average water use (row3, column 4).   
 
Water Management, Production, Income and Poverty 
 
Water management reform, at least when implemented as designed, leads to water savings and 
meets the primary goal of the water sector officials.  However, it is possible that the success from 
such a policy can only come at a cost, either in terms of falling production or income or increased 
poverty.  In this section, we examine how water management reform affects agricultural 
production.  We then examine its impact on income and the incidence of poverty.  
 
Descriptive statistics from our data show that water management reform negatively influences 
agricultural production (Table 6, rows 1 to 3).  Compared with collective management, in the 
villages that provide incentives to managers to save water, wheat yields decline by near 10 
percent.  Maize and rice yields also decline by 9 and 12 percent, respectively.  The negative 
effect of incentives on production is even clearer when comparing the yields between villages that 
nominally implement reforms but do not provide incentives to water managers with those that do 
provide incentives (rows 1 to 3, column 1 versus 2).  In the case of wheat and maize yields, while 
production in villages with managers that have positive incentives fall, those in villages that have 
moved to WUAs and contracting but have not provided incentives actually rise marginally.  In the 
case of rice, yields fall for villages that only reform nominally fall, but not as far as for villages that 
provide incentives to their managers.  Since the pattern in production is consistent with, though in 
the opposite direction, the correlations between water management and water use, suggest that 
water savings through management reform may only be able to come at a cost of lower yields.     
 
In contrast, the negative influence of water management reform on production does not appear in 
the descriptive statistics when examining farmer income (Table 6).  Evidence from our survey 
reveals in the villages in which leaders reformed their water management system and provided 
incentives to managers, farmers actually earn higher income (rows 4).  Surprisingly, crop income 
is also higher in villages that have provided managers with incentives (row 5).  Part of the 
                                                                   
4  We include village leader characteristics as IVs, following Brandt et al. (2003) and Li (1998).  In these papers, the 
authors claim that village leader characteristics may affect reform in the village, but their characteristics would not have 
an independent effect on production decisions (in our case, water use).   
5 To test if the set of identifying of identifying instruments are exogenous, a Lagrange multiplier test can be used 
(Hausman).  The chi-square-distributed test statistic with three degree of freedom, is N*R
2, where N is the number of 
observations, and R
2 is the measure of goodness-of-fit of the regression of the residues from the institutional equation (2) 
on the variables which are exogenous to the system.  The test statistics are 0.00 for WUAs, 0.05 for contracting, 1.36 
for non-collective with incentives and 2.27 for non-collective without incentives.  The test results indicate the null 
hypothesis that there is no correlation between the exogenous instruments and the disturbance term from institutional 
equation (2) cannot be rejected.  
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explanation for the difference between yields and income may be due to the fact that water fees 
also fall in villages that have reforme d.  It also may be that farmers are shifting their production 
decisions and allocating labor to other enterprises in villages that provide water managers with 
incentives.  Econometric analysis was used to isolate the effect of reform on income.  
Econometric analysis was also used to distinguish between income and poverty effects; in 
contrast to the case of income, our descriptive data show that poverty is worse in those villages 
that provide managers with incentives (row 6). 
   
Multivariate Empirical Model and Results 
 
In addition to water management reform, other socio-economic factors also influence agricultural 
production, income, and poverty.  In order to answer the question of whether water management 
reform affects outcomes, it is necessary to control for these other factors.   
 
To do so, we specify the link between agricultural production and its determinants as: 
   
ijk Q  =  ijk ijk ijk ijk ijk D Z X W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?            (3) 
 
where Qijk represents the yields of wheat, maize or rice from the  ith plot of household j in village k.  
In equation (3), yields are explained by the variable of interest, Wijk, which measures water use per 
hectare, X ijk, which measures other inputs to the production process, Zijk which holds other factors 
constant, including characteristics of the production envirnonment of the village, household and 
plot, and the irrigation district dummy, Dk. Agricultural production inputs include measures of per 
hectare use of labor (measured in man-days), fertilizer (measured in aggregated physical units
6) 
and expenditures on other inputs, such as fees paid for custom services.  The control variables 
for village and household characteristics are the same as for equation (1) except we do not use 
the village level cropping structure.  We also add five plot characteristics, including measures of: 
soil types; plot location (distance from the plot to the farmer’s house); whether the crop on the plot 
is planted in rotation with another crop or not (single season equals one, if not); and production 
shocks (measured as yield reduction on a plot due to floods, droughts or other “disasters”).   
 
The impact of water management reform is measured through the water use variable.  If 
production responds positively to water use, then we can deduce that water management reform 
will have an effect in the opposite direction, because of its water reducing effect found in Table 5.  
However, because Table 5 combined all crops together at the household level and in our 
production analysis wheat, maize and rice are examined separately at the plot level, we need to 
have separate measures of the effect of water management reform on water use by crop.  The 
results of these alternative water use equations are included in appendix D and show that in the 
case of all crops, the coefficient on the variable measuring the presence of incentives in local 
water management institutions is negative (and is significantly so for wheat and rice).
7  
Predictions from Appendix D are used in the estimation of equation (3). 
 
We also establish the following equation to examine the relationship between income and other 
factors: 
 
jk y  =  jk jk jk jk D Z M ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                          (4) 
 
where yjk represents either total or cropping income per capita or total income per capita for 
household j, and the other variables, including Mjk, our interested variable (a measure of incentives) 
are the same as in equation (1).  In examining the effect of water management reform on poverty, 
we proceed in a similar manner.  Because we are measuring poverty in terms of income, one 
would use primarily the same specification and expect similar results, albeit with opposite signs.    
 
                                                                   
6 To measure fertilizer, we decomposed each type of fertilizer by nutrients, N, P and K, and then summed across 
nutrients and fertilizer types.  We also aggregated fertilizer by value and our main results of interest do not change.   
7 The analysis uses plot level data for estimating the equation in Appendix D.  We also use predicted values of water 
management reform for the estimation of the equations in Appendix D because of our concerns of endogeneity.  
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Almost all the models specified on production, income and poverty perform well and produce 
robust results that largely confirm our a priori expectations (Tables 7 to 9).  The goodness of fit 
measure for production and income models, the adjusted R
2, arrange from 0.16 to 0.40.  Many 
coefficients of our control variables in these models were of expected sign and statistically 
significant.  For example, the production shock not only negatively influences agricultural 
production, but also reduces farmer income and adversely affects the household’s poverty status.  
Higher levels of landholdings also positively affect incomes.
8     
 
Our results show that reforming water management reduces wheat yields while it has no 
significant impact on the yields of maize and rice.  From the wheat water use model, when 
villages provide water managers with incentives, managers reduce water use per hectare about 
3800 cubic meter, a decline of about 50 percent (Append D, column 1, row 1).  At the same time, 
the coefficient on the predicted water use variable in the wheat yield equation is positive and 
statistically significant (Table 7, column 1, row 1).  The estimated water use elasticity for wheat 
yield is 0.226.  Overall, our estimates of the size of the decline in water use and the 
responsiveness of wheat yields to water use imply that water management reform reduces wheat 
yields by about 1 1 percent.  In contrast, although we find that incentives have a negative 
association on water use, the estimated water use elasticities for maize and rice are not 
significantly different from zero (Table 7, columns 2 and 3, row 1).   
 
Results from our plot level analysis of water management and production indicate that in our 
sample areas the main tradeoff between the water savings from management reform and 
production occurs for wheat and is less severe or absent for maize and rice.  The conclusion is 
plausible and, although its validity may hold only for our sample region, it is consistent with many 
of the observations made in the field.  Wheat is the crop that depends more than any other on 
irrigation because its growth period is almost entirely during  the dry season.  Water cutbacks 
should be expected to reduce yields.  Maize, in contrast, is grown during the wet season and 
water managers that have an incentive to save water may be able to time their use of irrigation 
water with the rains while those that have no interest in saving water might adhere to a 
predetermined water delivery schedule, no matter what the weather.  In the case of rice, although 
the crop is dependent on large volumes of irrigation water, experiments by domestic and 
international water scientists have shown that there are many new ways of managing rice irrigation 
(e.g. alternative wetting and drying – see Barker et al, 2002) that can lead to water savings but do 
not have significant yield effects in many cases.  New water management technologies, however, 
require effort to learn and implement.  Our results may demonstrate that it is managers with 
incentives that have been able and willing to use these new technologies that have brought water 
savings without large yield declines.  
 
Our research results also demonstrate that water management reform has no impact on farmer 
income status (Tables 8 and 9).  When we use either OLS or 2SLS approaches, the incentive 
variable in both total and cropping income models is not statistically significant.  Consistent with 
the descriptive statistics (which find no obvious fall in income in those villages that give water 
managers incentives), our results may suggest that whatever negative income effect there is from 
falling wheat production, it is being offset partially by reductions in water fees (water fees on 
average drop by around nine percent ).  It could also be that the average reduction in income due 
to lower wheat yields are small enough, 89 yuan (11 percent of average wheat yield, 4740 kg per 
hectare, times farm size, 0.17 hectare, times the price of wheat, 1 yuan per kg) that they can not 
be detected statistically.  Moreover, since the fall in household income is less than 1.2 percent, 
the losses in cropping likely are being offset by other actions taken by households (e.g. because 
water management is better, they can focus more on other economic activities).    
 
The similar results also can be found in the poverty model.  Since we measure poverty status as 
“under the poverty line or not,” our results say that there is no effect of a village’s decision to 
provide water managers with incentives on a household poverty status.  If universally true, such a 
                                                                   
8  Although the coefficients on the fertilizer variable in the maize and rice yield equations are positive, significant and 
similar to results found elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Putterman and Ciacu, 1995), as found in much of the literature 
on cross section production analysis at the household level, our other coefficients are insignificant due to measurement 
problems (e.g., we observe labor days, not effort), multicollinearity (e.g., when farmers use high levels of one input, they 




finding would be important, since critics of water management reforms often point out that one 
possible adverse consequence of using incentives to induce water reform is that managers may 
cut back on water deliveries to marginal users, who may also be those on the poorest land.  Our 
results here, however, should be interpreted with caution.  First, it has not been identified clearly 
what conditions may be behind this result.  In many villages, leaders have specified strict rules in 
the agreements with water managers that they cannot exclude households from water allocation 
schedules.  Second, as seen by examining the estimated equations in Table 9, only a few of the 
coefficients are significant, a sign the our sample may be too small to identify poverty effects.  In 
short, while interesting, we believe our current results may be more important in raising awareness 
of possible associations rather than as definitive.  Future research should try to pinpoint the 




In this paper, we have sought to u nderstand evolution of China’s surface water management 
systems and their effect on water use, output, income and poverty.  Research results show that 
since 1990, and especially after 1995, collective management has been replaced by non-collective, 
WUAs or contracting systems.  In some regions, non-collective management forms even have 
become the dominant pattern.  Innovation of water management has reflected many 
stakeholders’ interests, such as upper and local governments, village leaders and farmers.  In  
particular, policy makers’ interventions in the reform process seem to play an important role that 
made the spatial variation of the reform.   
 
Designing the reform is one issue, implementation is another issue.  Despite whether the reform 
has been designed well as considered by governments, effectively implementing the reform 
appears to be out of policy makers’ control and should be highly emphasized.  The major 
difference between non-collective and collective is the incentives faced by managers.  Proving 
the importance of incentives mechanism for water management is one of our important results.  
Research show that if managers are provided with positive incentives to earn money by saving 
water, they will try to improve water management, water delivered to farmers will be significantly 
reduced.  More importantly, our analysis found that even water management with incentives will 
reduce water use; it will not produce negative impacts on farmers’ output (except for wheat), 
income and poverty.  Although this results need to be further explored for possible long term 
impacts, at least in the short term, the concern on potential negative impacts of water 
management reform seems to be unnecessary.  
 
Overall, we propose that the government should continue to support the water management 
reform process.  However, different from the initial stage, more emphasis should be put on the 
effective implementation of the reform.  Although the negative impact on farmers have not been 
found in the short term, in the long term, the government still needs to focus on this issue and take 
some measures to promote the healthy development of water management reform.  Since reform 
will lead to water savings under the directives of policy makers’ design, the scope of how much 
water should be saved and how to efficiently reallocate the saved water to other water short 
regions that can maximize social benefits are two important issues that need to be further explored 
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Table 1. Surface water management in the sample villages, in 4 selected irrigation 
districts, 1990 – 2001 
Ningxia  Henan 
    ID-1  ID-2  ID-1  ID-2 
Total 
1990        (percent)       
   Collective    100  81    100  100    91 
WUA    0  5    0  0    3 
    
Contracting   0  14    0  0    6 
               
1995               
   Collective    100  72    100  100    87 
WUA    0  10    0  0    6 
    
Contracting   0  18    0  0    7 
               
2001               
   Collective    27  51    92  100    64 
WUA    50  14    0  0    14 
    
Contracting   23  35    8  0    22 
   









Table 2.  Incentives mechanism of WUA and contracting in the sample irrigation 
districts, 2001 
Percentage of samples (%) 
   
 With 
incentives   
Without 
incentives   Total 
Whole samples       
WUA and Contracting  41  59  100 
       
Ningxia Province        
ID-1  
     
             WUA  25  75  100 
             Contracting   0  100  100 
       
ID-2        
             WUA  25  75  100 
             Contracting   76  24  100 
       
Henan Province       
ID-1       
            Contracting   0  100  100 
 









































































Table 3.  Relationship between surface water management and crop water use in 
the sample irrigation districts, 2001 







   Collective  21294 
WUA  23460 
    Contracting  30969 
ID -2   
   Collective  16549 
WUA  15483 






   Collective  13052 
    Contracting  17113 
ID -2   
   Collective  8450 
 




Table 4.  Relationship between incentives mechanism and crop water use in the sample 
irrigation districts of Ningxia Province, 2001 
Crop water use (m
3/ha) 







Ningxia Province       
Whole samples  12729  20598  14003 
 
     
ID-1   25055  26583  21924 
ID-2   11188  14711  16549 
       
Wheat  5619  7416  7489 
Maize  7004  7704  7266 
Rice  31307  31688  36949 
 





Table 5  Determinants of crop water use at the household level 
Water use per hectare 
 
OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS 
Water management institution         
-1,311.036    -1,919.85    Share of WUA  
(0.70)    (1.00)   
-703.677    -2,468.59    Share of contracting 
(0.49)    (1.34)   
  -2,843.730    -6,355.798  Share of non-collective with 
incentives
a    (1.72)*    (1.99)** 
  275.206    1,107.587  Share of non-collective 
without incentives
a    (0.18)    (0.43) 
Production environment          
2,390.651  2,141.794  2,560.45  2,494.746  Share of village surface 
water irrigation   (0.99)  (0.90)  (1.08)  (1.06) 
-3,574.071  -3,811.787  -3,463.46  -3,533.920  Dummy of village water 
scarcity 
(1 yes  0 no) 
(3.13)***  (3.34)***  (3.03)***  (3.13)*** 
-0.107  -0.055  -0.114  0.032  Village irrigation investment 
per hectare  (1.01)  (0.52)  (1.11)  (0.23) 
Cropping structure         
10,592.172  10,430.425  10,655.04  10,437.281  Share of village rice area in 
1995  (4.18)***  (4.17)***  (4.23)***  (4.18)*** 
Household characteristics         
519. 380  447.423  551.829  517.174  Age of household head 
(1.17)  (1.02)  (1.25)  (1.18) 
-6.282  -5.610  -6.705  -6.296  Squared age of household 
head  (1.28)  (1.15)  (1.37)  (1.29) 
-81.947  -78.691  -79.195  -58.589  Education of household 
head  (0.50)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.36) 
-10,486.693  -7,920.360  -8,964.48  -6,326.932  Arable land per hectare of 
household  (2.23)**  (1.64)  (1.89)*  (1.26) 
14,261.399  15,130.403  13,821.54  12,514.529 
Constant  (1.43)  (1.53)  (1.39)  (1.27) 
Observations  189  189  189  189 
Adjusted R-squared  0.44  0.45  0.45  0.45 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; coefficients of irrigation districts are omitted  
a Non-collective institutions include WUA and contracting
 





Table 6  Incentives, production, income and poverty in the sample irrigation districts, 
Ningxia and Henan Province, 2001 
    Non-collective 




Wheat yield (kg/ha)  4340  4827  4800 
Maize yield (kg/ha)  5328  6031  5801 
Rice yield (kg/ha)  6288  6499  7155 
Income (yuan)  2334  1966  1646 
Cropping income (yuan)  1073  784  726 
Poverty incidence (%)  11.1  6.5  7.5 





Table 7  Determinants of crop yield (2SLS) 
Log of crop yield per hectare 
    Wheat  Maize  Rice 
Production input       
0.226  0.043  0.148  Log of water use per hectare
a 
(3.15)***  (0.32)  (1.05) 
-0.009  0.099  -0.003  Log of label use per hectare 
(0.26)  (1.51)  (0.07) 
0.020  0.110  0.182  Log of fertilizer use per hectare 
(0.44)  (1.75)*  (2.53)** 
-0.001  -0.002  0.018  Log of other p roduction fee per 
hectare  (0.09)  (0.21)  (1.49) 
Production environment        
0.197  -0.027  0.103  Share of village surface water 
irrigation  (2.39)**  (0.13)  (0.62) 
0.086  0.029  0.133  Dummy of village water scarcity 
(1 yes  0 no)  (1.63)  (0.23)  (1.38) 
0.000  0.000  0.000  Village irrigation investment per 
hectare  (0.51)  (1.18)  (2.21)** 
Household characteristics       
-0.028  -0.020  -0.029  Age of household head 
(1.74)*  (0.76)  (1.04) 
0.000  0.000  0.000  Squared age of household head 
(2.13)**  (0.85)  (0.77) 
0.023  0.006  -0.016  Education of household head 
(3.04)***  (0.55)  (1.45) 
Plot characteristics       
0.081  0.137  0.077  Dummy of loam soil 
(1 yes  0 no)  (1.75)*  (1.80)*  (1.16) 
0.095  0.154  0.039  Dummy of clay soil 
(1 yes  0 no)  (2.04)**  (2.08)**  (0.60) 
-0.008  0.016  -0.016  Distance to home 
(0.24)  (0.25)  (0.49) 
0.061  -0.010  -0.029  Dummy of single crop 
(1 yes  0 no)  (0.82)  (0.09)  (0.13) 
Production shock       
-1.411  -1.026  -1.469  Yield reduction due to production 
shock  (10.37)***  (4.94)***  (7.45)*** 
6.365  7.310  6.698  Constant 
(7.96)***  (4.73)***  (4.27)*** 
Observations  234  158  113 
Adjusted R-squared  0.40  0.16  0.37 
apredicted water use by the determinants of water use model (Appendix D)  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; coefficients of irrigation districts are omitted 







Table 8  Determinants of farmer income 
Total income per capita  Cropping income per 
capita   
OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
Water management institution         
175.109  688.980  -136.262  69.719  Share of non-collective 
with incentives
a  (0.53)  (1.08)  (1.06)  (0.28) 
-18.277  -108.274  -61.382  -95.177  Share of non-collective 
without incentives
a 
(0.06)  (0.21)  (0.54)  (0.47) 
Production environment          
337.665  301.020  -112.871  -125.975  Share of village surface 
water irrigation  (0.73)  (0.66)  (0.62)  (0.70) 
157.467  144.952  -15.764  -3.154  Dummy of village water 
scarcity   (0.70)  (0.66)  (0.18)  (0.04) 
0.069  0.056  0.012  0.007  Village irrigation 
investment per hectare   (3.37)***  (2.08)**  (1.54)  (0.65) 
Cropping structure         
198.901  198.012  -56.991  -59.428  Share of village rice area 
in 1995  (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.30)  (0.32) 
Household characteristics         
183.491  178.580  49.640  51.933 
Age of household head  (2.13)**  (2.07)**  (1.48)  (1.53) 
-1.759  -1.710  -0.587  -0.609  Squared age of household 
head  (1.84)*  (1.79)*  (1.57)  (1.62) 
21.984  19.876  -7.920  -8.093  Education of household 
head  (0.70)  (0.63)  (0.65)  (0.66) 
3,291.145  3,034.111  3,270.769  3,167.299  Arable land per hectare of 
household  (2.99)***  (2.71)***  (7.48)***  (7.07)*** 
0.111  0.110      Production asset per 
capita  (3.49)***  (3.45)***     
    0.081  0.080  Agricultural production 
asset per capita      (1.76)*  (1.74)* 
-124.052  -127.845  -3.112  -7.441  Number of plots per 
household  (3.68)***  (3.79)***  (0.24)  (0.56) 
Production shock         
-229.269  -219.720  -183.171  -180.501  Dummy of production 
shock  (1.23)  (1.18)  (2.52)**  (2.47)** 
-2,707.916  -2,458.543  -472.618  -459.997  Constant 
(1.41)  (1.29)  (0.63)  (0.61) 
Observations  189  189  189  189 
Adjusted R-squared  0.24  0.25  0.35  0.35 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; coefficients of irrigation districts are omitted  
a Non-collective institutions include WUA and contracting 




Table 9  Determinants of poverty 
Dummy of poverty 
 
OLS  2SLS 
Water management institution     
0.086  0.057  Share of non-collective with 
incentives
a  
(1.21)  (0.41) 
0.032  -0.040  Share of non-collective without 
incentives
a  
(0.52)  (0.36) 
Production environment      
-0.175  -0.167  Share of village surface water 
irrigation  (1.75)*  (1.68)* 
0.001  -0.008  Dummy of village water scarcity 
    ( 1 yes  0 no)  (0.03)  (0.16) 
-0.000  -0.000  Village irrigation investment per 
hectare  (1.07)  (0.85) 
Cropping structure     
0.012  0.018 
Share of village rice area in 1995 
(0.12)  (0.17) 
Household characteristics     
0.007  0.009 
Age of household head 
(0.40)  (0.45) 
-0.000  -0.000 
Squared age of household head 
(0.53)  (0.60) 
-0.009  -0.010 
Education of household head 
(1.39)  (1.40) 
-0.297  -0.261 
Arable land per hectare of household 
(1.24)  (1.07) 
-0.000  -0.000 
Production asset per capita 
(0.76)  (0.72) 
0.012  0.013 
Number of plots per household 
(1.70)*  (1.83)* 
Production sh ock     
0.095  0.095  Dummy of production shock 
(1 yes  0 no)  (2.36)**  (2.33)** 
0.083  0.087 
Constant 
(0.20)  (0.21) 
Observations  189  189 
Adjusted R-squared  0.01  0.01 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; coefficients of irrigation districts are omitted  
a Non-collective institutions include WUA and contracting 




Appendix A: Calculation of crop water use 
 
 
At first, we checked the variable of water use per irrigation by crops estimated by canal managers 
and village leaders, then we averaged their information to estimate average water use per 
irrigation by crops in the village.  According to our survey, nearly 80 percent of village leaders and 
canal managers can give a relatively  accurate estimation on this number which are generally 
consistent with local officials’ estimation or their experimental results.  If existing some heretical 
data, we will adjust them by the secondary source data and other villages’ estimation those having 
similar physical and water conditions.  For the rest of the villages where it is hard to estimate 
water use by crops, they can provide the information on irrigation hours per mu and water depth in 
the field by crops.  Since this information are also provided by those villages that have water use 
estimation, we will compare this information and then get an estimation of water use per irrigation 
by crops if these villages have similar physical and water conditions.  Finally, each village will get 
one estimation on average water use per irrigation by crops.  We apply this information to each 
sample household and multiply it by irrigation times of crops per year in certain land plot answered 
by farmers and then get annual total water use in the sample land plot s of farm households.  





















Appendix B  Statistic Description of Major Variables 









Share of WUA management  0.14  0.34  0  1 
Share of Contracting   0.22  0.39  0  1 
Share of non-collective with incentives  0.16  0.36  0  1 
Share of non-collective without incentives  0.20  0.39  0  1 
Dummy of governmental intervention for WUA   0.14  0.35  0  1 
Dummy of governmental intervention for 
Contracting  0.30  0.46  0  1 
Age of village leader (year)  43  7  29  55 
Education of village leader (year)  9  3  0  15 
Share of village surface water irrigation  0.73  0.41  0  1 
Dummy of village water scarcity  0.27  0.45  0  1 
Village irrigat ion investment (yuan/ha)  2824  4881  0  33943 
Share of village rice area in 1995 (%)  0.19  0.21  0  0.80 
Household crop water use per hectare 
(m
3/ha)  15365  8739  627  44580 
Wheat water use per hectare (m
3/ha)  5937  3909  300  21000 
Maize water use per hectare (m
3/ha)  6936  4802  360  27750 
Rice water use per hectare (m
3/ha)  28882  18572  1381  89072 
Household total income (yuan)  1855  1426  -42  11087 
Household cropping income (yuan)  806  604  -135  4285 
Dummy of poverty  0.08  0.27  0  1 
Age of household head (year)  44  9  24  66 
Education of household head (year)  6  3  0  15 
Arable land per hectare of household (ha)  0.17  0.12  0.03  1.03 
Production asset per capita (yuan)  1434  2972  2  32533 
Agricultural production asset per capita (yuan)  906  857  1  4800 
Number of plots per household (number)  7  4  1  23 
Dummy of production shock  0.52  0.50  2  1 
Wheat yield (kg/ha)  4740  1253  375  8625 
Maize yield (kg/ha)  5760  1770  600  10125 
Rice yield (kg/ha)  6900  1740  1125  12855 
 





Appendix C  Determinants of water  management institution at the 
village level 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
















Water policy         
0.864  0.670  0.212  0.424  Dummy of governmental 
intervention  (22.43)***  (7.72)***  (2.10)**  (4.53)*** 
Characteristics of village leaders         
0.000  -0.017  -0.013  -0.003 
Age of village leader  (0.21)  (3.32)***  (1.80)*  (0.47) 
0.002  -0.005  -0.029  0.021  Education of village leader  (0.45)  (0.37)  (1.43)  (1.13) 
Production environment          
0.004  0.182  -0.078  0.263  Share of village surface water 
irrigation   (0.08)  (1.23)  (0.38)  (1.39) 
-0.001  0.086  0.015  0.060 
Dummy of village water 
scarcity  
(1 yes  0 no)  (0.06)  (1.16)  (0.15)  (0.63) 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  Village irrigation investment per 
hectare   (10.43)***  (0.54)  (2.40)**  (0.28) 
Cropping structure         
0.016  -0.051  -0.055  0.043  Share of village rice area in 
1995  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.25)  (0.21) 
Observations  51  51  51  51 
Adjusted R-squared  0.94  0.65  0.23  0.42 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; coefficients of irrigation districts are omitted 
a Non-collective institutions include WUA and contracting 





Appendix D  Determinants of crop water use at the plot level 
Water use per hectare 
 
Wheat  Maize  Rice 
Water management institution       
-3,802.375  -2,107.654  -23,149.103  Share of non-collective with 
incentives
a   (2.83)***  (1.09)  (2.24)** 
-1,054.236  992.491  -5,943.309  Share of non-collective without 
incentives
a  
(0.96)  (0.63)  (0.64) 
Production environment        
61.923  -1,555.108  1,018.291  Share of village surface water 
irrigation  (0.06)  (0.64)  (0.10) 
-1,911.910  -3,510.065  -11,202.815 
Dummy of village water scarcity  (3.90)***  (4.45)***  (2.75)*** 
0.110  0.090  -1.948  Village irrigation investment per 
hectare  (1.79)*  (1.02)  (1.83)* 
Cropping structure       
-3,210.399  -1,106.899  11,146.211  Share of village rice area in 1995 
(2.79)***  (0.54)  (0.96) 
Household characteristics       
29.091  -251.383  2,779.020  Age of household head 
(0.16)  (0.84)  (1.68)* 
-0.560  2.725  -32.915 
Squared age of household head  (0.28)  (0.82)  (1.80)* 
-198.481  -144.878  -687.514 
Education of household head  (2.91)***  (1.31)  (1.18) 
-218.531  -5,470.061  25,745.862  Arable land per hectare of 
household  (0.10)  (1.76)*  (1.61) 
Plot characteristics       
347.962  -309.517  1,619.001  Dummy of loam soil 
(0.66)  (0.36)  (0.38) 
358.484  -44.854  1,204.337 
Dummy of clay soil  (0.68)  (0.05)  (0.29) 
-51.871  1,119.131  190.460  Distance to home   (0.15)  (1.57)  (0.10) 
841.530  1,429.926  -2,000.727 
Dummy of single crop  (1.04)  (1.25)  (0.15) 
Constant  12,469.815  18,713.794  -3,738.899 
  (3.00)***  (2.64)***  (0.10) 
Observations  234  163  114 
Adjusted R-squared  0.41  0.31  0.30 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; coefficients of irrigation districts are omitted 
a Non-collective institutions include WUA and contracting 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 